

Station: Munich, Al 13

Report No: 27.

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Report Date: 13 August 1946

Source: LYNX Group (F)

Information Date: August 1946

Sub-Source:

Date Info. Received:

Evaluation: F-0

SUBJECT: Liquidation of Bunker 1/B-P/5

SECRET
CONTROL

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3020
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

1. A decision has to be made soon on how to apply the information supplied by the LYNX Group on the activity and personnel of the Munich Bunker. The plans which are made should result in:

- a. Checking on the reliability of the LYNX Group.
- b. Eliminating the dangerous organized activity of the Munich Bunker.
- c. Gaining information on SIC methods of operation in the field.

2. It is more difficult to decide on the methods to employ in order to achieve the greatest success in realizing these aims.

a. Should all known members of the Bunker be arrested? This would give us the greatest chance at eliminating the bunker's activity and the most men for interrogation purposes. It would, however, conclusively prove to the SIS that the UHVR (which has been playing with the Bunker) is actively cooperating with us.

b. The other extreme is to arrest only the chief of the Bunker and the courier. Interrogation of these two, plus interrogation of Maria BYTECH, who is already under arrest, would give us most of the needed information and would also paralyze the Bunker's activity. This might, however, scare the rest of the people so that we may lose contact with them (through the UHVR).

c. It might be profitable to make this a local operation: arrest all persons of the Munich Bunker and of the Munich Bunka, but leave the remaining Bunki alone. One of the UHVR men could be allowed to "warn" one of the other Bunki, a little bit too late, so that he would gain the absolute trust of these people and remain with them as our plant.

d. It might be better still to plan to arrest everyone. Choose our UHVR plant carefully and instruct him to warn one of the Bunki in time for them to "save" another Bunka. This certainly would be sufficient testimony for the Soviet agents that our plant is reliable.

3. If the latter plan is acceptable, it should be submitted through CIB to CIC for coordinated action.

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